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RELIEF FROM RETALIATION: DOES TITLE VII
ALLOW A PRIVATE RIGHT TO
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 expressly forbids employer
retaliation against employees who oppose discriminatory employment
practices or who participate in any investigation of charges of discrimina-
tion filed pursuant to the Act.2 The need for such a statutory proscrip-
tion against retaliation is clear: The purpose of Title VII to prevent
employer discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin can hardly be realized if employers remain free to punish employ-
ees who protest such discrimination. However, effective and meaningful
enforcement of the proscription against retaliation remains a problem.
Nearly all the states have their own fair employment practices statute
and administrative enforcement agency designated by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as a "706 Agency."3 In those
states, a claimant must first file a discrimination complaint with the ap-
propriate state or local agency;4 otherwise, the complaint is to be filed
directly with the EEOC.5 In Oklahoma, enforcement of fair employment
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982). See Denis, How to Identify Employment Discrimination Re-
taliation Claims, 66 Cm. B. REc. 168 (1984).
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.80 (1988). There is at least one certified designated 706 Agency in all but
six of the states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Dakota. Id. To
be designated a 706 Agency, the state (or local government) must enact a fair employment law
forbidding discrimination based on race, color, religious affiliation, sex, or national origin and must
establish an enforcement authority. Id. at § 1601.70(a). The conclusions of certified 706 Agencies
on discrimination claims are not automatically reviewed by the EEOC unless requested by one of the
parties. Id. at § 1601.76. North Dakota has a 706 Agency that is not certified, while Georgia has a
designated 706 Agency for claims of Georgia state employees only. Id at § 1601.74, 1601.80.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(e) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)-(e) (1988); Comment, The
Role of Preclusion Rules in Title V1L An Analysis of Congressional Intent, 71 IowA L. REv. 1473,
1473 (1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(1) (1988). The EEOC has provided
an alternate procedure to avoid statute of limitations problems caused by confusion over where an
initial complaint should be filed. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4) (1988). Under this regulation, claims
incorrectly filed first with the EEOC are forwarded to the appropriate state agency. Id. at
§ 1601.13(a)(4)(i) (1988). See Comment, Procedural Prerequisites for Bringing a Title VIIAction-
42 U.S. C § 2000e-5, 27 How. L.J. 437 (1984), for a detailed discussion of filing procedures; See also
Harlton, Filing Requirements Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 55 OKLA. B. J. 2666
(1984); Stone & Johnson, Time Limitations for Title VII Charges, LAB. & EMPLOYMENT REV., Jan.
1985, at 47.
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practices is the province of the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission. 6
After filing a discrimination charge with the state fair employment op-
portunity agency, the claimant must wait sixty days before filing a claim
with the EEOC.7 In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to allow the
EEOC 180 days after a filing to investigate the complaint, to attempt a
reconciliation between the employer and employee, and ultimately to de-
cide whether to pursue an action against the employer in the federal
courts.' Should the EEOC decide not to pursue the claim at the close of
the 180-day period, it must issue a "right-to-sue" notice to the claimant. 9
The claimant then has ninety days in which to bring a private action
under Title VII against the employer in federal court.' 0
Although Title VII encourages the EEOC to seek preliminary in-
junctive relief against retaliatory conduct," in practice this authority is
seldom used.' 2 In the face of this lack of administrative enforcement
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.80 (1988). The Oklahoma Human Rights Commission was created in
1963 to investigate and to prevent discrimination based on "race, color, creed, national origin, age,
handicap, or ancestry" by Oklahoma state departments or agencies. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 954
(1981 & Supp. 1985). In 1968, the Oklahoma Legislature extended this protection beyond state
government employees and included sex discrimination; prohibitions against handicap discrimina-
tion and age discrimination followed in 1981 and 1985. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1302 (1981 & Supp.
1985). Oklahoma statutes now prohibit discrimination by employers of more than 15 persons, em-
ployment agencies, labor organizations, places of public accommodation, and housing; the Human
Rights Commission is the enforcement mechanism for all such claims of discrimination. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1101-1505 (Supp. 1985). If unable to negotiate a conciliation agreement, the Com-
mission is empowered to issue cease and desist orders; however, such orders are not enforceable
unless a district court issues an enforcement order. Id. at §§ 1505-06.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
9. Id Of course, a plaintiff may bring an action for sex discrimination or retaliatory discharge
in state court if the jurisdiction recognizes such a cause of action. Under the common law employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, both the employer and employee have the right to terminate the employment
at any time. Eg., Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 552 (Okla. 1987). However, several jurisdic-
tions have recognized various causes of action for terminating an employee maliciously or in bad
faith or in contravention of public policy. Eg., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427
A.2d 385 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The deterioration
of the employment-at-will doctrine in Oklahoma has been the subject of considerable controversy. In
the most recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case on the subject, Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24
(Okla. 1989), the court recognized a tort cause of action for termination of an employee in contra-
vention of public policy as established by constitutional law, a statute, or case law. Id. at 28. Based
on this decision, a plaintiff fired in retaliation might now opt to sue in Oklahoma state court.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). See Note, When Does the Ninety Day Complaint Filing
Period Begin for 42 US. C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)? Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Department, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1988). There is disagreement among the circuits regarding the date on
which the 90-day period begins to run. At least two circuits follow a "flexible rule" which allows an
equitable tolling of the 90 days; the Seventh Circuit follows a more restrictive "actual receipt rule."
Id. at 782-83. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the alternating jurisdiction of employ-
ment discrimination claims between state and federal courts, see Comment, supra note 4.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982); 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
12. See Ashton, The Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief to Private Plaintiffs Pending
2
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against retaliation, the United States Courts of Appeals remain split on
the questions of whether the employee has the right to seek preliminary
injunctive relief and whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over these
types of cases pending administrative consideration of the original dis-
crimination charge. In the interest of fairness and according to the pur-
pose of Title VII, a district court should have jurisdiction to consider a
private action for immediate relief from retaliation without requiring the
private plaintiff to wait the six months required for EEOC consideration
of the original claim.
II. THE PROBLEM OF RETALIATION
Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC had no direct
power to enforce the provisions of the Act. 3 Although an action by the
private plaintiff was the primary means of enforcing the law, the statute
did not indicate whether the claimant had the right to seek preliminary
injunctive relief against any retaliatory action suffered as a result of filing
discrimination charges.14 No pre-1972 cases upheld a private right to
preliminary injunctive relief,"5 but some courts have subsequently stated
their belief that such a right did indeed exist. 6
After the 1972 amendments, section 2000e-5 specifically authorized
the EEOC to seek preliminary injunctions against retaliation, but the
amendments made no mention of whether the claimant had any personal
right to seek injunctive relief.17 The right to preliminary injunctive relief
became more important because of the increased "waiting period" al-
lowed the EEOC. The amendments lengthened this period from thirty to
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Action Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 51, 53-55 (1976), for a discussion of EEOC internal practice and procedures
relating to preliminary injunctive relief. In 1989, the EEOC received 59,411 charges of discrimina-
tion and sued or intervened in 599 actions. The EEOC sought preliminary injunctive relief only 11
times. Telephone interview with Barbara Roberts, Information Division, EEOC (Feb. 12, 1990).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970).
14. Id.
15. Ashton, supra note 12, at 64. An opinion of the Second Circuit suggests that the availabil-
ity of injunctive relief to a private plaintiff was not an issue prior to the 1972 amendments because
the waiting period for EEOC consideration of the claim was only 30 days (as compared to the
current 180-day requirement). Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 882 (2d Cir.
1981).
16. Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1973) (The court of appeals
stated "prior to the 1972 amendment, it is clear that a victim of such forbidden conduct as was here
alleged had a clear right to seek equitable relief without having to await the convenience of the
EEOC."), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974); Sheehan, 676 F.2d at 882-83.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(5) (1982).
1990]
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180 days, 8 which is a significant length of time to endure employer retal-
iation. Unfortunately, the EEOC rarely seeks preliminary relief on be-
half of a claimant suffering retaliation despite statutory authority to do
SO.19
While the primary issue to claimants concerns whether a district
court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider a private plaintiff's suit
for preliminary injunctive relief, such a suit must also satisfy the prereq-
uisites for equitable relief. The traditional elements that a court weighs
in a suit for equitable relief include: (1) a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of the claim; (2) a probability of irreparable injury to
the plaintiff absent injunctive relief; (3) the potential for harm to other
parties; and (4) the public's interest.2 0 Other courts employ a modifica-
tion of the traditional test wherein the plaintiff must show either prob-
able success on the merits and irreparable injury, or must show that the
plaintiff's suit raises serious issues and that the balance of hardships tips
in favor of the plaintiff.21 The heart of the controversy concerns whether
retaliatory actions constitute irreparable injury." Of those cases uphold-
ing subject-matter jurisdiction over private suits for equitable relief,
nearly all held that the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the prerequisites for
such relief.23 Thus, the fortunate plaintiff who seeks preliminary relief in
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970); Sheehan, 676 F.2d at 882.
19. Roberts interview, supra note 12.
20. E.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21. Duke v. Langdon, 695 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir.), reh g granted, 701 F.2d 768 (1983);
McGinnis v. United States Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 522 (N.D. Cal. 1980). Another example
of a modified test for injunctive relief is that employed by the Fourth Circuit: while the traditional
four factors are to be considered, the irreparable injury and probability of harm factors are consid-
ered most important. "If that balance is struck in favor of plaintiff, it is enough that grave or serious
questions are presented; and plaintiff need not show a likelihood of success." Guerrero v. Reeves
Bros., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 603, 606 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (quoting Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig
Mfg. Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977)).
22. Under Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974), mere lost wages do not constitute irrep-
arable injury. For a more detailed treatment of the requisite standard for equitable relief, see Drach-
sler, Burdens of Proof in Retaliatory Adverse Action Cases Under Title VII, 35 LAD. L.J. 28 (1984);
Weintraub, Employment Discrimination Cases Under Title VII: The Presumption of Irreparable
Harm in Preliminary Injunction Motions, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 197 (1982); Note, Irreparable
Injury: Improper Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in EEOC Cases?, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1163
(1986).
23. Wagner, 836 F.2d at 576; Duke, 695 F.2d at 1137; McCarthy v. Cortland County Commu-
nity Action Program, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 333, 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Guerrero, 562 F. Supp. at 607.
One circuit court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the merits of the
preliminary injunctive suit. Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 887 (2d Cir. 1981).
In Bailey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 942, 944 (1st Cir. 1983), the court was able to avoid
deciding the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to award the plaintiff relief by holding that the
plaintiffs were unable to show irreparable injury. However, in McGinnis v. United States Postal
Serv., 512 F. Supp. 517, 524-26 (N.D. Cal. 1980), the plaintiff met the standard for preliminary
injunctive relief by showing a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and irreparable injury. The
4
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a jurisdiction that does recognize such a private right of action still faces
a second battle to meet the stringent standard required for a preliminary
injunction.
Jurisdictions are split, and the Tenth Circuit is silent, on the ques-
tion of whether a private plaintiff has the right to seek a preliminary
injunction against employer retaliation. Only one reported district court
decision from within the Tenth Circuit has squarely addressed this issue,
but the decision is now fifteen years old.24 The court followed the more
conservative position that no private right to equitable relief existed prior
to issuance of a right-to-sue letter.25 In general, other courts within the
Tenth Circuit appear to construe strictly the procedural requirements set
out in Title VII.26 In contrast to such rigid interpretations, courts within
this circuit should look to the overall purpose of Title VII and should
allow private plaintiffs to seek preliminary injunctive relief against retali-
ation while the EEOC considers the underlying discrimination
complaint.
III. DECISIONS FAVORING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR PRIVATE
PLAINTIFFS
Drew v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 27 is frequently cited as the
leading case upholding the right of a private plaintiff to seek injunctive
relief prior to the close of the 180-day period during which the EEOC
considers the original discrimination complaint.28 In Drew, the plaintiff
sought a preliminary injunction for reinstatement after being fired by her
employer allegedly in retaliation for the discrimination claim she had
filed with the EEOC.29 Because Drew's dismissal had occurred immedi-
ately after she filed her charges, the EEOC had not issued her a right-to-
sue notice, although it did issue her the notice a month later.30 In addi-
tion, the EEOC also filed suit seeking the same preliminary injunctive
court found irreparable injury demonstrated both by virtue of the Ninth Circuit rule that such injury
is presumed by a preliminary finding of a Title VII violation and because the employer's acts consti-
tuted an infringement of plaintiff's first amendment right to freedom of religion. Id. at 525.
24. Collins v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 376 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
25. Id. at 983.
26. See, eg., Mills v. Jefferson Bank E., 559 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1983).
27. 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
28. Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 886 n.15 (2d Cir. 1981); Doerr v. B. F.
Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 321 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
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relief as Drew."' As a result, the district court granted the EEOC's ap-
plication for injunctive relief but dismissed Drew's claim on the ground
that no jurisdiction existed under Title VII to grant such relief to a pri-
vate plaintiff.32  On appeal of the dismissal of Drew's complaint, the
Fifth Circuit broadly stated that an individual who met the traditional
requirements for injunctive relief had the right to seek injunctive relief in
order to "maintain the status quo," pending EEOC review of the under-
lying discrimination claim.33
Because of the unusual facts of the case, in which the EEOC did
eventually issue a right-to-sue letter and actually joined in the private
claimant's suit for equitable relief, the precedential value of the Drew
decision in supporting a private right to equitable relief prior to the 180-
day waiting period has been questioned. 4 Courts have also questioned
the interpretation in Drew of congressional intent underlying the original
1964 Act and the 1972 amendments.3 5 Nevertheless, other courts soon
followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit.
In Berg v. Richmond Unified School District,6 the Ninth Circuit up-
held a district court's jurisdiction over a private plaintiff's suit for injunc-
tive relief. The district court granted the injunction until the plaintiff
received a right-to-sue letter authorizing her to pursue her action on the
merits.37 Although the court of appeals first upheld the district court's
action based on the plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court
also looked to Drew and stated that the district court had jurisdiction
under Title VII.3 ' However, the court somewhat undermined the effec-
tiveness of this holding by stating that any possible jurisdictional defect
was "cured" by the plaintiff's subsequent receipt of her "right-to-sue"
notice, which enabled her to supplement her complaint on the merits.3 9
31. Id.
32. Id. at 71-72.
33. Id. at 72. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
in the limited class of cases, such as the present, in which irreparable injury is shown and
likelihood of ultimate success has been established .... the individual employee may bring
her own suit to maintain the status quo pending the action of the Commission on the basic
charge of discrimination.
Id
34. McGee v. Purolator Courier Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Nottelson v.
A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Collins v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
376 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Okla. 1974); See also Ashton, supra note 12, at 58.
35. Collins, 376 F. Supp. at 981-82.
36. 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1071, vacated, 434 U.S. 158 (1977).
37. Id. at 1211.
38. Id. at 1211-12.
39. Id. at 1212. One district court interpreted this decision as expressing doubt regarding the
[Vol. 25:639
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Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Berg decision 4° on other grounds, the estab-
lished position of the Ninth Circuit remains that jurisdiction exists to
consider a private plaintiff's application for preliminary injunctive relief
prior to the end of the 180-day waiting period.41
In a brief footnote, the Eighth Circuit also upheld a district court's
assumption of jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief
prior to issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC.42 Although the
footnote does not appear to be strictly necessary to the court's overall
holding in the case, it is accepted as the official position of the Eighth
Circuit by other courts.43
In McCarthy v. Cortland County Community Action Program,
Inc.,' the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York offered several compelling reasons for holding that district courts
may consider private suits for injunctive relief prior to completion of
EEOC administrative proceedings. First, the court questioned whether
the 1972 amendments' grant to the EEOC of the right to seek injunctive
relief impliedly repealed the private right to equitable relief already in
existence, "particularly since repeals by implication are not favored and
will not be assumed absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent."4"
The court also rejected an interpretation of the 1972 amendments which
would "encourage employers to profit" from retaliatory conduct by mak-
ing preliminary injunctive relief inaccessible to the majority of Title VII
claimants.46 Moreover, the McCarthy court pointed to the policy of the
Second Circuit to avoid strict interpretations of procedural requirements
which would "defeat the fundamental purposes" of Title VII.47
One year after the McCarthy decision, the Second Circuit officially
adopted the position that federal courts do have jurisdiction to grant pre-
liminary injunctive relief to private plaintiffs prior to issuance by the
"propriety and jurisdictional basis" of this type of action. McGee v. Purolator Courier Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 1285, 1288 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
40. 434 U.S. 158 (1977).
41. Duke v. Langdon, 695 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir.), reh'g granted, 701 F.2d 768 (1983).
42. McNail v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 549 F.2d 538, 542 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977).
43. Bailey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 942, 944 (Ist Cir. 1983); Sheehan v. Purolator
Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 886 n.15 (2d Cir. 1981); Guerrero v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 562 F. Supp.
603, 605 (W.D.N.C. 1983); McCarthy v. Cortland County Community Action Program, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 333, 337 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
44. 487 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
45. Id. at 338 (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
46. Id. at 338.
47. Id. at 338-39.
1990]
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EEOC of a right-to-sue notice."8 In Sheehan v. Purolator Courier
Corp. , the Second Circuit based such jurisdiction both on the spirit of
Title VII and on the traditional equitable powers exercised by courts.
According to the court, Congress enacted the 1972 amendments "to ex-
pand, not to contract, the avenues of enforcement of Title VII. ' 50 Grant-
ing the EEOC the power to seek injunctive relief was intended to
supplement, rather than supplant, the private plaintiff's right to sue dis-
criminatory employers.5 Moreover, the Second Circuit cited a long line
of Supreme Court decisions upholding the power of a court to issue in-
junctive relief in situations where that court will eventually have jurisdic-
tion to review the merits of the case.52 Finally, the court stated that
"[u]nimpeded retaliation" would frustrate the purpose of Title VII by
decreasing the likelihood of employer-employee reconciliation and by
chilling employees from protesting employer discrimination. 3
After Sheehan, courts in at least two additional jurisdictions
adopted the rule that private plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunc-
tive relief against retaliation. In 1983, the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina followed the Second, Fifth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in accepting jurisdiction of such claims, in
the absence of any guidance to the contrary from the Fourth Circuit. 4
In 1987, the District of Columbia Circuit became the most recent circuit
court to find that jurisdiction exists over private requests for injunctive
relief in retaliation cases.5 5 As the Second Circuit had in Sheehan, the
District of Columbia Circuit in Wagner v. Taylor found that both con-
gressional intent and the "inherent equitable power" of the courts sup-
ported the conclusion that a federal district court may grant injunctive
relief where the plaintiff meets the requisite traditional elements.5
In addition to the five circuits which now support a private right to
48. Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 877.
50. Id. at 883.
51. Id. In support of this argument, the court relied on General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318 (1980), in which the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe amendments did not transfer all private
enforcement to the EEOC and assign to that agency exclusively the task of protecting private inter-
ests... [t]he EEOC was to bear the primary burden of litigation, but the private action previously
available under § 706 was not superseded." General Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 326 (citations omitted).
52. Sheehan, 676 F.2d at 884 (citing FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966)).
53. Sheehan, 676 F.2d at 885.
54. Guerrero v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 603, 606 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
55. Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
56. Id. at 571-76.
[Vol. 25:639
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equitable relief, the First Circuit in Bailey v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.57 ex-
pressed some approval of the trend but did not adopt the rule. The court
refused to bar private suits for preliminary injunctive relief, stating that it
could find no evidence that Congress intended to preclude district courts
from exercising their "customary equitable authority."58 However, the
court was able to avoid ruling on the issue by narrowly holding that the
plaintiffs did not show the irreparable injury necessary to justify granting
a preliminary injunction.59
Therefore, while not all circuit courts have considered the issue,
nearly half of the circuits have adopted the position that district courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction enabling them to grant equitable relief to
private plaintiffs while the EEOC action remains pending. These courts
generally base their holdings on the congressional intent underlying the
enactment of Title VII and on the inherent power of the courts to award
equitable relief where they will have final jurisdiction over the merits.
Moreover, these courts have recognized that such preliminary injunctive
relief is necessary to discourage employers from retaliating against Title
VII claimants.
IV. DECISIONS FINDING No JURISDICTION EXISTS TO AWARD
RELIEF TO PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
In contrast to the Drew-Sheehan line of cases, a number of courts
have taken the more conservative approach that a Title VII claimant
may not seek preliminary injunctive relief prior to completion of the
EEOC administrative process. It is interesting to note, however, that
only one court of appeals, the Sixth Circuit, has issued an opinion refus-
ing to allow such suits, and no court has followed this approach since
1979.60
Jerome v. Viviano Food Co.61 appears to be the first opinion rejecting
preliminary relief to a private plaintiff and the only such opinion issued
by a court of appeals. In Jerome, the plaintiff sought preliminary injunc-
tive relief prior to receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. The
plaintiff's EEOC complaint alleged that the Viviano Food Co. refused to
hire her because of her sex.62 Because there was no existing employment
57. 722 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1983).
58. Id. at 944.
59. Id.
60. Eg., Doerr v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320, 323 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
61. 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974).
62. Id. at 966.
1990]
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relationship, the court was easily able to distinguish Drew. 63 Although
the Jerome court upheld the district court's denial of equitable relief on
the narrow grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish irreparable
harm,61 the court also expressed disapproval of the plaintiff's attempt "to
obviate the statutorily required cooling off and conciliation period.",
61
The court made clear that it supported strict adherence to the time limi-
tations and procedural formalities set forth in Title VII.
In Troy v. Shell 0il Co.,66 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan pointed to the disapproving language in Je-
rome as proof that "judicial activism ' 67 of the kind exhibited by the Fifth
Circuit in Drew,65 would not be tolerated in the Sixth Circuit.69  The
Troy court was most critical of the Fifth Circuit's comparison of the situ-
ation in Drew with that of the plaintiff in Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., °
a race discrimination suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In deciding Drew,
the Fifth Circuit had looked to Sanders as support for its argument that,
as with section 1981 plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs had also possessed an
unqualified right to seek equitable relief prior to the 1972 amendments.71
The Troy court did not address the most compelling issue discussed in
63. Id Because there was no existing employment relationship between the parties, the plaintiff
was seeking injunctive relief to compel Viviano Foods to act by hiring her, as opposed to the usual
retaliation case where the plaintiff requests preliminary injunctive relief toprevent the employer from
acting. Therefore, although Jerome has been cited as precedent for rejecting equitable relief for
private plaintiffs (Guerrero v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 603, 605 (W.D.N.C. 1983)), at least
one court has criticized the use of this opinion as precedent for denying equitable relief in retaliation
cases. Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 886 n.15 (2d Cir. 1981).
64. Jerome, 489 F.2d at 966.
65. Id.
66. 378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
67. Id. at 1047.
68. 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
69. Troy, 378 F. Supp. at 1047 (citing Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir.
1974)).
70. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
71. Troy, 378 F. Supp. at 104647. However, in its critique of the Fifth Circuit's comparison of
the Drew case with that of Sanders, the Troy court misses the major point of the Drew analysis. In
Troy, the court states that "ft]he obvious flaw in this analysis is that neither Ms. Drew nor Ms. Troy
are at all in the position of Ms. Sanders... [who] sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 . . . [which] is
directed exclusively at discrimination based on race or alienage, and has no application in cases of
sex-based discrimination." Troy, 378 F. Supp. at 1046. However, the most significant point of the
Drew-Sanders comparison was not that the two causes of action were similar, but that § 1981 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 each forbade discrimination while leaving enforcement solely to private
individuals. Drew, 480 F.2d at 73. Based on this comparison, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[w]e have
no doubt ... that, prior to the amendment of 1972, Ms. Drew could have filed the suit for an
injunction pending the consideration to be given to her charges by the EEOC." Id. Thus, the cen-
tral issue in the Drew analysis concerned whether, in passing the 1972 amendments allowing the
EEOC to seek preliminary relief, Congress intended to foreclose the previously existing private right
to seek equitable relief. Id. at 73-74.
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Drew: whether the 1972 amendments giving the EEOC enforcement
powers were intended to foreclose the previously existing private right to
equitable relief.72 The court also criticized the "concept of partial juris-
diction" upheld in Drew, stating that "[l]acking jurisdiction over the un-
derlying cause of action, the court is without authority to provide relief
of any sort[,]" '73 without conceding that the only barrier to jurisdiction
over the merits of such a Title VII claim would be cured by the passing
of time. Therefore, although the court recognized that precluding pri-
vate equitable relief was less than desirable, it nevertheless denied the
plaintiff's request for an injunction.74
Two other district courts from within the Sixth Circuit generally
followed the analysis found in Troy in rejecting the availability of private
equitable relief." In Doerr v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,76 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found several persuasive
decisions, including Jerome and Troy, which rejected jurisdiction over
private claims for preliminary injunctive relief as contrary to the Title
VII scheme "mandating initial administrative efforts at conciliation and
voluntary settlement. ' 77  The court in McGee v. Purolator Courier
Corp.,7 also refused to flout its interpretation of the established congres-
sional scheme. First, the court cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,79 in which the Supreme Court stated that both a properly filed
claim with the EEOC and a receipt of a right-to-sue notice were "the
jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action" under Title VII.O The
McGee court also noted that there appeared to be no pre-1972 cases that
granted equitable relief to a private plaintiff prior to issuance of an EEOC
right-to-sue letter." Thus, that court could discern no justification to
72. See Drew, 480 F.2d 73-76.
73. Troy, 378 F. Supp. at 1048.
74. Id.
75. Nottelson v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Doerr v. B. F. Good-
rich Co., 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
76. 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
77. Id. at 322. However, one commentator states that "t]here is no evidence whatever to indi-
cate that the 180-day deferral period was ever intended to be a 'cooling off' period in which employ-
ers would be free from judicial or EEOC sanctions&]" but rather was meant to allow the EEOC time
to consider the discrimination charge and determine whether it would act on the charge. Ashton,
supra note 12, at 68.
78. 430 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
79. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
80. McGee, 430 F. Supp. at 1286 (emphasis in original) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973)). However, McDonnell Douglas concerned the prerequisites for
plaintiff to file suit on the merits of his discrimination claim, rather than a suit for preliminary
injunctive relief. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 798.
81. McGee, 430 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
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conclude, as did the Fifth Circuit in Drew, that such a right existed.
V. THE LAW WITHIN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The only decision from within the Tenth Circuit on this issue is Col-
lins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 2 In Collins, the plaintiff first
filed charges with the EEOC alleging that Southwestern Bell had dis-
criminated against him on the basis of his religion. Collins then re-
quested injunctive relief to restore him to his former position."3
However, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma refused to depart from the express statutory procedures of
Title VII. According to the court, the purpose of the 180-day deferral
period was to allow sufficient time for conciliation between employer and
employee; therefore, Congress intended action in the federal courts to be
the last resort available to Title VII claimants.84 The court also stated
that the "comprehensive nature of the legislative scheme embodied in
Title VII" indicated that Congress intended to eliminate any private
right to preliminary injunctive relief when it extended that right to the
EEOC.85 The court was further persuaded to reject the plaintiff's claim
for equitable relief because the plaintiff had also requested a hearing on
the merits of his discrimination claim, thereby attempting to circumvent
the EEOC administrative procedures altogether.86
Unfortunately, no appeal was taken from the Collins decision; thus,
one can only speculate as to what the decision of the Tenth Circuit might
have been. Some district court opinions on Title VII matters from within
the circuit exhibit a conservative, procedure-bound approach. For exam-
ple, in Mills v. Jefferson Bank East,7 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiff's Title VII complaint on
the ground that the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC was defectively
issued prior to the close of the 180-day deferral period, thus defeating
subject-matter jurisdiction.88 The court's reasoning was that issuance of
a right-to-sue notice prior to the 180-day period violated congressional
intent that the EEOC have 180 days to effect a conciliation between the
parties.89 This decision was also not appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
82. 376 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
83. Id. at 980.
84. Id. at 981-82.
85. Id. at 983.
86. Id at 980, 983.
87. 559 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1983).
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. Although the Mills court cited a number of district court decisions holding that a right-
[Vol. 25:639
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An examination of Tenth Circuit decisions concerning the proce-
dural requirements of Title VII provides a basis to argue that the court
will find a private claim for a preliminary injunction against retaliation to
be appropriate. In Smith v. Oral Roberts Evangelistic Association,9" the
plaintiff filed a Title VII claim alleging sexual discrimination in the ter-
mination of her employment. However, the plaintiff filed the claim after
the expiration of the Oklahoma statutory deadline for such claims. The
Tenth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver91 had impliedly struck down the Tenth Circuit's strict approach
on filing deadlines in Title VII cases. 2 Thus, where the plaintiff in Smith
had missed the Oklahoma deadline for filing a complaint but had fied
with the EEOC within the 240-day period approved in Mohasco, failure
to meet the Oklahoma limitations period would not foreclose the plain-
tiff's right to sue under Title VII. The court stated "[n]othing in Title
VII requires filing with the state or local agency (or the EEOC) within
the time periods commanded by state law ... we cannot construe 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) or (e) to require filing within state specified time lim-
its. This construction is fully consistent with Title VII's remedial pur-
poses."93  Therefore, because preliminary injunctive relief is also
consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII, the Tenth Circuit
should logically extend its reasoning in Smith to allow a private plaintiff
to seek such relief.
In Brown v. Hartshorne Public School District No. 1,94 the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit which al-
leged retaliation in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff had originally
filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the defendant refused to
hire her for the 1984-85 school year because of her national origin. The
EEOC subsequently issued her a right-to-sue letter. The next year, the
school district again refused to hire the plaintiff. Rather than filing an-
other charge with the EEOC, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that the
school district refused to employ her for the subsequent school year in
retaliation for her 1984-85 EEOC charge. The district court dismissed
to-sue notice issued prior to the 180-day time period is defective, a number of courts have considered
suits based on such early notices. See, eg., Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.
1973); Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975). Apparently, issuance
of early right-to-sue notices is common practice in some district EEOC offices. Ashton, supra note
12, at 77.
90. 731 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1984).
91. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
92. Smith, 731 F.2d at 690.
93. Id. at 687.
94. 864 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1988).
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her case on grounds that she needed to file another EEOC charge for any
discriminatory actions subsequent to the original charge. 9" In reversing
the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiff's
judicial complaint "may encompass any discrimination like or reason-
ably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge,"96 and found that a
retaliatory act is "reasonably related" to the EEOC charge which pre-
ceded it.97 Thus, the Tenth Circuit refused to follow a narrow interpreta-
tion of the procedural requirements of Title VII. This decision supports
the argument that the court would also reject a narrow interpretation of
Title VII's provision on preliminary relief in favor of the less restrictive
approach followed in the Drew-Sheehan line of cases.
When the issue of preliminary injunctive relief against retaliation is
brought before the Tenth Circuit, the language of Title VII and its legis-
lative history should convince the court that granting preliminary injunc-
tive relief to a private plaintiff may be necessary. Prior to the 1972
amendments to Title VII, private parties, not the EEOC, possessed the
right to seek judicial relief.98 When Congress enacted the 1972 amend-
ments, it granted the EEOC authority to sue for temporary or prelimi-
nary injunctive relief where "prompt judicial action is necessary to carry
out the purposes of [the] Act." 99 Thus, the question becomes whether
Congress intended this power to be exclusively held by the EEOC.
VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
An exclusive EEOC right to injunctive relief seems inconsistent with
the remedial nature of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly in retali-
atory action cases. The purpose of the section 2000e-3 prohibition
against retaliation is to encourage employees to resist discriminatory
practices. However, an employer who knows that only the EEOC has
the power to request immediate relief from the retaliation can rightly
conclude that the chances that the EEOC will seek injunctive relief are
slight. Although a retaliation victim may eventually receive damages
through judicial action, under Title VII damages are not available to
95. Id. at 681-82.
96. Id. at 682 (quoting Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.
1973)).
97. Id.
98. Ashton, supra note 12, at 51. The United States Attorney General could bring suit if "a
pattern or practice of resistance" against Title VII existed. Id. at n.4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6(a) (1970)).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982).
[Vol. 25:639
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compensate the victim for the emotional and mental stress of being fired
or otherwise harassed. Retaliatory termination may plunge an employee
into poverty, resulting in the loss of home and possessions, and possibly
even the disintegration of the employee's family. Employees who know
that retaliation may not be remedied for months, even years, are far less
likely to oppose employer discrimination. Such realities mean that limit-
ing the right to preliminary relief solely to the EEOC undermines Title
VII's prohibition against retaliation.
Of course, all retaliation claims are not equal. Less extreme forms
of retaliation, such as denial of promotions or raises, are less catastrophic
than termination of employment. Immediate relief from less severe retal-
iatory conduct may not be integral to enforcement of Title VII's prohibi-
tion against retaliation. However, such differences in the necessity for
immediate relief need not influence the issue of whether a private plaintiff
should be entitled to seek such relief. Regardless of the form of retalia-
tion, the plaintiff's claim must meet the traditional standards for equita-
ble relief, such as irreparable injury and substantial likelihood of success
on the merits of the claim.°0°
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments indicates that con-
gressional intent was to enhance enforcement of Title VII. In effect,
Congress created two avenues of enforcement under the 1972 amend-
ments: the first through the EEOC and, failing that, through suit by the
claimant. Although the statute prescribes at least a six-month delay
before a plaintiff may litigate the merits of a discrimination claim, Con-
gress recognized that immediate relief might be necessary when it pro-
vided that the EEOC may seek preliminary injunctive relief. In fact,
legislative history indicates that Congress deemed preliminary relief to be
"central" to the adequate protection of claimants.101 In granting the
EEOC the power of enforcement, Congress preserved the claimant's pri-
vate right of action "to make clear that an individual aggrieved by a
violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim" should
the EEOC decline to file suit, and "to make sure that the person ag-
grieved does not have to endure lengthy delays if the Commission or
Attorney General does not act with due diligence and speed.""0 2 If Con-
gress intended that aggrieved persons should not be forced to abandon
100. E.g., Baker v. Board of Regents, 721 F. Supp. 270, 272 (D. Kan. 1989).
101. 118 CONG. REc. 7564 (1972). Apparently when Congress authorized the EEOC to seek
preliminary relief it did not consider the backlog at the EEOC, which delays processing complaints.
See supra note 12.
102. 118 CONG. REc. 7565 (1972). The conference report also states, "the provisions... allow
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their claims if the EEOC failed to act on the merits, it seems logical that
retaliation victims should not be forced to abandon their claims for im-
mediate relief if the EEOC fails to seek an injunction.
Additionally, the conference report on the 1972 amendments states
that "in any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any
areas where a specific contrary intention is not indicated" existing case
law would not be disturbed.103 The language of section 2000e-5(f)(2)
does not consitute a "specific contrary intention" against federal court
jurisdiction over private claims for preliminary injunctive relief. The lan-
guage of the statute is not mandatory but permissive: "the Commission
... may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary re-
lief." I° The fact that suit by the EEOC for preliminary relief is optional,
even where such relief "is necessary to carry out the purposes of [the]
Act,"1 5 indicates that the right to injunctive relief was not intended to
be exclusive to the EEOC. Replacing the private right to preliminary
relief with an administrative right which is exercised at whim would con-
tradict the remedial purpose of the statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to eliminate discriminatory employment practices prohib-
ited by Title VII, aggrieved persons who file claims or otherwise oppose
discriminatory practices must enjoy immunity from employer retaliation.
Retaliatory acts which are not quickly enjoined naturally chill employees
from exercising their rights under Title VII. Although the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII authorized the EEOC to seek preliminary injunctive
relief, the statute does not specifically address whether a private plaintiff
may seek preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo while
the EEOC considers the underlying claim.
The courts of appeals in at least five circuits have held that district
courts may consider private actions for equitable relief while the EEOC
has jurisdiction over the underlying claim. Only one court of appeals
decision has held to the contrary. While the Tenth Circuit has not yet
ruled on the issue, an older district court decision from within the circuit
followed the conservative view that no jurisdiction exists.
Courts within the Tenth Circuit should follow the majority view
the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under this title in the courts where
there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution." Id.
103. Id. at 7564.
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that private plaintiffs may seek preliminary relief against retaliation. Ju-
risdiction over such suits is supported by the language of Title VII and
the intent of Congress revealed in the legislative history of the 1972
amendments. Only by providing preliminary injunctive relief to retalia-
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